82 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
82 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Stop leaking Kubernetes service information via DNS
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weight: 1
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---
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A talk by Google and Ivanti.
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## Background
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* RBAC is ther to limit information access and control
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* RBAC can be used to avoid interfearance in shared envs
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* DNS is not really applicable when it comes to RBAC
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### DNS in Kubernetes
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* DNS Info is always public -> No auth
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* Services are exposed to all clients
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## Isolation and Clusters
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### Just don't share
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* Specially for smaller, high growth companies with infinite VC money
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* Just give everyone their own cluster -> Problem solved
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* Smaller (<1000) typicly use many small clusters
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### Shared Clusters
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* Becomes imporetant when cost is a question and engineers don't have any platform knowledge
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* A dedicated kube team can optimize both hardware and deliver updates fast -> Increased productivity by utilizing specialists
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* Problem: Noisy neighbors by leaky DNS
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## Leaks (demo)
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### Base scenario
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* Cluster with a bunch of deployments and services
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* Creating a simple pod results in binding to default RBAC -> No access to anything
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* Querying DNS info (aka services) still leaks everything (namespaces, services)
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### Leak mechanics
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* Leaks are based on the `<service>.<nemspace>.<svc>.cluster.local` pattern
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* You can also just reverse looku the entire service CIDR
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* SRV records get created for each service including the service ports
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## Fix the leak
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### CoreDNS Firewall Plugin
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* External plugin provided by the coredns team
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* Expression engine built-in with support for external policy engines
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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req-->metadata
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metadata-->firewall
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firewall-->kube
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kube-->|Adds namespace/clientnamespace metadata|firewall
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firewall-->|send nxdomain|metadata
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metadata-->res
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```
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### Demo
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* Firwall rule that only allows queries from the same namespace, kube-system or default
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* Every other cross-namespace request gets blocked
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* Same SVC requests from before now return NXDOMAIN
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### Why is this a plugin and not default?
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* Requires `pods verified` mode -> Puts the watch on pods and only returns a query result if the pod actually exists
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* Puts a watch on all pods -> higher API load and coredns mem usage
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* Potential race conditions with initial lookups in larger clusters -> Alternative is to fail open (not really secure)
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### Per tenant DNS
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* Just run a cporedns instance for each tenant
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* Use a mutating webhook to inject the right dns into each pod
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* Pro: No more pods verified -> Aka no more constant watch
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* Limitation: Platform services still need a central coredns
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